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Abstract
Since 1980 the U.S. economy has experienced a large increase in income inequal-
ity. To explain this phenomenon we develop a life-cycle, overlapping generations
model with uninsurable labor market risk, a detailed tax system and investment-
specific technological change (ISTC). We calibrate our model to match key character-
istics of the U.S. economy and study how ISTC, shifts in taxation, government debt
and employment have contributed to the rise in income inequality. We find that these
structural changes can account for close to one third of the observed increase in the
post-tax income Gini. The main mechanisms in play are the rise in the wage pre-
mium of non-routine workers, resulting from capital-non-routine complementarity,
as well as a reduction of the progressivity of the labor income tax schedule, which
increases post-tax inequality. We show that ISTC alone accounts for roughly 15% of
the change observed in post-tax income Gini, while the reduction in progressivity
accounts for 16%.
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1 Introduction
There has been a steady rise in income inequality in the U.S. since 1980. Figure 1
shows that this phenomenon occurred in tandem with a fall in the relative price of
investment, which can be viewed as reflecting investment-specific technological change
(Krusell et al., 2000; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), and a sharp reduction in tax
progressivity (Ferriere and Navarro, 2018). In this paper, we use an incomplete markets
model calibrated to the U.S. economy to study how each of these factors has influenced
the rise in income inequality.
We design an overlapping generations model featuring investment-specific techno-
logical change, a detailed tax schedule, uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk, and in-
complete markets. To generate factor-biased technological change, we assume some
agents are born with abilities that are complement to capital while others are born with
abilities that are substitute to capital. These distinct labor varieties are called routine
and non-routine, respectively. We incorporate an additional dimension to the analysis
of labor varieties by dividing workers into the skilled/unskilled categories. This allows
us to take into account the rise in the skill premium (Krusell et al., 2000), and to analyze
how the different categories of workers are affected by the selected structural changes.
This is close to the spirit of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017a), although, to our knowledge,
we are the first to simultaneously include these two dimensions in standard incomplete
markets model.
Aside from the direct impact of a fall in tax progressivity on income dispersion, the
main mechanism at work in our model is the rise in the wage premium of non-routine
workers, following a drop in investment prices. This is the result of the complementar-
ity between capital and non-routine labor. As investment prices fall, capital accumula-
tion becomes cheaper and firm demand for routine labor drops, along with wages. In
contrast, non-routine labor becomes a more productive input, raising wages and labor
demand for those workers.
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Figure 1: Inequality, technology and taxation. Notes: Gini indices are from the World Inequality
Database (WID). The relative price of investment is computed as the ratio between the price
indices of non-residential investment and consumption goods, which are normalized to 1 in 1964.
The series are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income Accounts
Table 1.1.4. The income tax progressivity is computed using the method in Ferriere and Navarro
(2018). The income tax scale parameter is obtained from the marginal tax rate formula in Ferriere
and Navarro (2018).
We find that ISTC and the fall in tax progressivity jointly account for at least one third
of the increase in the income Gini coefficient. In particular, by means of counterfactual
exercises we show that ISTC alone accounts for roughly 15% of the change in model post-
tax income Gini, while the reduction in progressivity accounts for 16%. Other structural
changes, such as the increase in non-routine relative employment, and social security
taxes dampen these mechanisms by reducing the marginal productivity of non-routine
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labor and increasing the progressivity of the tax system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the streams of lit-
erature to which this paper is related. In Section 3, we discuss the stylized facts that
underlie our modeling choice. In Section 4, we describe the model. In Section 5, we
show the calibration strategy. In Section 6, results are presented. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature which documents a reduction in the labor share
of income as a result of a fall in investment prices. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
show that the labor share has been declining across countries at least since the early
1980s. Using a general equilibrium model to obtain an expression for the labor share
as a function of the price of investment goods, they are able to account for half of the
observed decline in the labor share.
Eden and Gaggl (2018) estimate that the labor share in the U.S. has dropped by
6.8 percentage points since 1950. This drop was concurrent to a reduction in routine
occupations, and of the price of information and communication technology (ICT) capital
goods. Using a mechanism similar to Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), they estimate
that the drop in ICT capital prices accounts for half of the drop in the labour share.
The key ingredient that generates a contraction of the labour share in these models
is the substitutability between capital and unskilled or routine labour in the production
function, in the tradition of Krusell et al. (2000). This feature, coupled with a reduction in
investment good prices, leads firms to substitute away from labour and towards capital.
Our main mechanism is similar to that of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Eden
and Gaggl (2018), but our focus are the distributional aspects which they abstract from
in analyzing the effects of the drop in investment prices.
This paper is related to the heterogeneous agents literature which quantifies the effect
3
of structural changes in the income and wealth distributions. In particular, Hubmer
et al. (2017), which investigate the change in the wealth distribution in the U.S. as a
result of changes in taxation. Similarly, Civale (2016) quantifies the impact that ISTC has
produced on the wealth distribution. In contrast to these recent contributions, our focus
is on the income distribution and on nesting these competing mechanisms on a single
model, in order to evaluate their relative contributions.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the effects of automation (Autor et al.,
2003; Michaels et al., 2010; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017a; Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2017b; Guerreiro et al. (2017); Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Autor et al. (2003) docu-
ment that computer capital substitutes for workers in performing cognitive and manual
tasks, and complements workers in performing non-routine problems-solving. They
argue that these features can account for a substantial fraction of the resulting shift in
demand toward college-educated labor. Michaels et al. (2010) use cross-country industry
level data to analyze the demand across skill levels and conclude that industries with
faster ICT growth had greater increases in relative demand for high skill workers and
larger falls in relative demand for middle skill workers. They find that there is little
effect on low-skilled workers mainly performing routine tasks.
In string of recent papers Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Retrepo have both con-
tributed to measuring the effects of automation and formalized them into a task-based
model of the labor market. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b) investigate the impact of
a greater robot usage in the US local labor markets. Their findings indicate large and
robust negative effects on employment and wages. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) de-
velop a theoretical framework where automation produces two competing effects on
wages and labor demand: a displacement effect resulting from the substitution of labor
for machines, reducing the demand for labor and wages; a productivity effect which is
the product of cost-savings generated by automation, which increases the demand for
labor in the remaining tasks.
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In the model of Guerreiro et al. (2017) routine jobs performed by low skill agents can
be taken over by automation units. As the marginal cost of producing robots changes
across steady states, routine labor wages and employment change in the same direction,
given the assumption of substitutability. They study the problem of optimal taxation
and find that it is optimal for the government to provide a lump sum rebate financed by
taxes on automation units. This result follows from an information asymmetry problem
(in the spirit of Mirrlees, 1971), whereby the social planner cannot distinguish between
routine or cognitive workers and is thus unable to condition transfers on individuals’
types. Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the macroeconomic impact
of these mechanisms and quantitatively accounting for their effects on income inequality
in the US economy.
To dilute the perceived social cost of these trends several policies have been sug-
gested, including a proposal famously put forth by Bill Gates to tax robots and “even
slow down the speed [of automation]” (Delaney, 2017). The issue of optimal capital
taxation has been discussed extensively since the seminal papers by Chamley (1986) and
Lucas (1990), who find that the the optimal rate of capital taxation is zero in the steady
state. In contrast, Aiyagari (1995), using an incomplete markets model with borrowing
constraints, determines that the optimal income tax on capital income is positive, even
in the long run.
3 Data
Our analysis of the U.S. labor market is carried out along two dimensions which have
been found to be relevant when discussing the effects of technological change (Autor
et al., 2003): (i) the nature of the tasks involved, i.e., whether they are susceptible to au-
tomation (routine) or not (non-routine); (ii) skill level, i.e., whether workers are college-
educated or not. We combine these two dimensions were into four mutually exclusive
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groups: non-routine skilled (NRS) workers, non-routine unskilled (NRU) workers, rou-
tine skilled (RS) workers and routine unskilled (RU) workers. We use data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Population Survey (CPS), spanning the period
from 1968 to 2016, to study how quantities and prices have changed since the late 1960s
for each of these groups.
We used the Annual Social and Economic Supplement from the March CPS survey
available from Flood et al. (2018), which contains data on yearly earnings and weeks
worked in the previous calendar year. The CPS employs the US Census Bureau 2010
occupation classification system, and we use the cross-walk table of Cortes et al. (2016)
to categorize each worker into either routine and non-routine occupations. This is the
so-called “consensus” classification scheme of Autor and Acemoglu (2011). Our division
into skilled/unskilled is also that of Autor and Acemoglu (2011), where skilled workers
are defined as those with at least one year of college. The population of interest is the set
of non-military, non-institutionalized individuals aged 16 to 70, working full time, full
year in the previous year, excluding self-employed and farm sector workers.
These data are used to construct series on group employment counts, raw wage
differentials, and wage premia associated with skill and task type. To calculate the wage
premia we use the method of Autor and Acemoglu (2011). Concretely, we run yearly
cross sectional regressions of weekly log wages on task type, race (black, non-white
other), potential experience in years, education, and interactions between education and
experience up to the forth order separately for each gender. We then construct a set of
bins for every combination of gender/race/work experience/task type/education level
with constant weights for every period, defined as the average weight of a given group
on total employment. The regression is used to predict the log-wage for each group in
each year. Wage premia are defined as the log-difference in predicted wages between
two groups whose only difference is either task type or skill level. The variables used
are described on Appendix A.
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Figure 2: The rise of non-routine skilled labor. Notes: Wage differentials are obtained as the
log difference between the average wage of each group. Groups for wages are constructed with
using a constant composition of individual observable characteristics (experience, education, etc).
Wage statistics are for males.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of employment and wages for the selected groups.
We can discern four main stylized facts: (i) the strong performance of NRS workers
compared to other groups and, in particular, RU workers; (ii) the strong growth of
skilled worker groups relative to unskilled; (iii) the rise of the skilled and non-routine
skilled premia. Our estimate of the skill premium has leveled off since 2000, informing
our decision to focus our modeling efforts on the routine/non-routine dimension. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present estimates of both the skill and the
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non-routine wage premia which are orthogonal to each other.1
The central hypothesis in this paper is that one of the main drivers of the increase
in inequality since the 1980s has been the discriminating effect that investment specific
technological change has had on these four groups due to its diverse interaction with
each labor variety. This reasoning is similar to that of Krusell et al. (2000), Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b), and Eden and Gaggl (2018).
This choice was made due to the quantitative importance of ISTC for the long-run
growth of output per hours worked in the U.S. economy, originally estimated to be 60%
in Greenwood et al. (1997), as well as its potential to disrupt labor market conditions.
Indeed, Krusell et al. (2000) used a model of capital-skill complementarity and ISTC
to study the increased wage dispersion in the U.S economy and are able to track the
progress of the skill premium. Similarly to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b) and Eden
and Gaggl (2018), we view the process of ISTC as akin to increased automation of routine
tasks in the economy. However, we focus on the wage premium rather than on worker
displacement in this paper.
Central to investment-specific technological change are the falling prices of capital
goods, which can be interpreted as evidence of increasing productivity in the invest-
ment goods sector. As an illustration of this interpretation, consider that in the 1950s a
computer was leased for 200,000 per month in inflation-adjusted 2010 dollars, plus the
costs of the staff and energy required to operate it.2 Today, any computer or smartphone
equipped with microprocessors costs a fraction of that price and is able to deliver a pro-
cessing speed which is many million times that of a large-scale computer in the 1950s.3
To get a sense of the scale of technological change, the CPU of a Play Station 2 is 1,500
times faster than the guidance computer on Apollo 11, while the Apple iPhone4 is 4,000
1Eden and Gaggl (2018) do not show their estimate of the skill wage premium.
2Source: http://ethw.org/Early_Popular_Computers,_1950_-_1970.
3Not to mention holding a much larger quantity of information: in 1956, IBM’s 305 RAMAC disk could
hold 5 MB of information, while the computer on which this paper was written has a total of 4.78 TB in
hard drive memory.
8
times faster.
Is there reason to believe that this source of growth has a uniform impact across labor
markets? Krusell et al. (2000) argue that this is not the case. Using aggregate U.S. data
they estimate the parameters for a CES production function where capital, skilled and
unskilled labor are embedded. They find that capital is a gross complement with skilled
labor and a gross substitute for unskilled labor. Therefore, secular growth is skill-biased
and is able to reproduce the rise in the skill premium observed in the U.S. since the
start of the 1980s, highlighting the importance of worker training for productivity and
inequality. Both Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Eden and Gaggl (2018) depart
from similar hypotheses in building their frameworks.
4 Model
The model is an incomplete markets economy with heterogeneous agents and partial
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk that is able to generate both income and wealth distribu-
tions. There are two types of households – non-routine and routine – that derive utility
from non-durable consumption and leisure. The non-routine households are born with
certain abilities, such as creativity, that allow them to perform tasks that are complement
to capital. Routine households, on the other hand, are born with abilities that allow them
to perform tasks that are substitute to capital. Each type of households face an idiosyn-
cratic uninsurable stream of earnings in the form of wages, and make joint decisions
about consumption, savings and hours worked. We further divide household types into
skilled and unskilled, in order to assign the wage differentials observed in the data and
the employment weights.
For the production side of the economy, we draw heavily on the modeling strategy in
Krusell et al. (2000) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). We assume the existence of a
two-sector economy of consumption and investment goods. This formulation allows us
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to express the price of investment goods as a function of the level of technology in that
sector relative to the consumption goods sector. We use a production function which
embeds complementarity between capital and the non-routine labor variety, very similar
to the one used in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). The asset structure used follows
the same framework of Krusell et al. (2010), in order include investment prices in the
household decision.
Demographics
We assume the economy is populated by a set of J − 1 overlapping generations, as in
Brinca et al. (2016). A household starts his life at age 20 and after retiring at age 65
households face an age-dependent probability of dying, pi(j), dying with certainty at
age 100. We define a period in the model to correspond to one year. Thus, j, the house-
hold’s age, varies between 0 (for age 20 households) and 80 (for age 100 households).
ω(j) = 1−pi(j) defines the age-dependent probability of surviving, and so, at any given
period, using a law of large numbers, the mass of retired agents of age j ≥ 45 is equal
to Ωj = ∏
i=j
i=45 ω(i). There are no annuity markets, so that a fraction of households
leave unintended bequests which are redistributed in a lump-sum manner between the
households that are currently alive, denoted by Γ. We include a bequest motive in this
framework to make sure that the age distribution of wealth is empirically plausible, as
in Brinca et al. (2018) and Brinca et al. (2019).
Households also differ across persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks, perma-
nent ability, asset holdings, and a discount factor assuming three distinct values β ∈
{β1, β2, β3, β4}, which are uniformly distributed across agents. Working age agents have
to choose how much to work, nt, how much to consume, ct, and how much to save, kt+1,
to maximize their utility. Retired households have consumption and saving decisions
and receive a retirement benefit, Ψt.
Prior to joining the labor market agents draw from a uniform distribution with
thresholds p1, p2, p3 to determine which group they belong to. Groups are ordered
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in the following way: NRS, NRU, RS, RU. Therefore, an agent enters the NRS market
if its draw is no greater than t1. Each group is assigned a fixed effect over the routine
unskilled, a1, a2, a3, which is used to calibrate the inequality between groups. The aim of
this setting is to accommodate, in a reduced form manner, the coexistence of occupation
type and skill level in each of these markets, where only the occupation type actually
enters the production function.
Labor income
Labor productivity depends on three distinct elements which determine the number of
efficiency units each household is endowed with in each period: age j, labor group a,
and an idiosyncratic productivity shock, u, which we assume follows an AR(1) process:
uit = ρuui,t−1 + εi,t, εi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ε ). (1)
Thus, household i’s wage is given by:
wi,t(j, a, u) = wsi,te
γ1 j+γ2 j2+γ3 j3+ai,t+ui,t , s ∈ {NR, R}, (2)
where γ1, γ2 and γ3 are calibrated directly from the data to capture the age profile of
wages. Households’ labour income depends on the wage per efficiency unit of labor
ws, s ∈ {NR, R}, where s stands for the labor variety that is supplied by the individual,
either non-routine or routine, respectively.
Preferences
The utility of households, U(ct, nt), is increasing in consumption and decreasing in work
hours, nt ∈ (0, 1], and is defined as:4
U(ct, nt) =
c1−λt
1− λ − χ
n1+ηt
1+ η
. (3)
4We assume that labour disutility depends only on the level of supply, not on skill type.
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Retired households’ utility function has one extra term, as they gain utility from the
bequest they leave to living generations:
D(h′t) = ϕ log(h′t). (4)
Technology
Consumption and investment goods are produced by means of transforming intermedi-
ate inputs using a linear production technology. All payments are made in terms of the
consumption good, which is the numeraire.
The consumption good is obtained by transforming a quantity zct of intermediate
input into output, which is then sold at price Pct to both households and the government.
The transformation technology is:
Ct + Gt = zct , (5)
where zct is the quantity of input, purchased at p
z
t from a representative intermediate
goods firm. Given that the final consumption good is competitively produced, its price
equals the marginal cost of production:
PCt = 1 = p
z
t . (6)
Investment goods firms operate in the same competitive environment. The produc-
tion of Xt, the investment good, uses the transformation technology:
Xt =
(
1
ξt
)
zxt , (7)
where zxt (z) is the quantity of input z used in the production of the final investment
good. ξt is the level of technology used in the production of Xt relative to the final
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consumption good. As ξt declines, the relative productivity in assembling the investment
good increases. We assume that ξt evolves exogenously in this economy. We obtain the
price of the investment good from the zero profit condition:
PXt = ξt p
z
t = ξt, (8)
where ξt = PXt /P
C
t is interpreted as the relative price of the investment good.
An representative intermediate goods firm produces input quantity zct + z
x
t using a
constant returns to scale technology in capital and labor inputs, yt(z) = F(kt(z), nNRt (z), n
R
t (z)).
It rents capital at rate rt and labour at wNRt and w
R
t for non-routine and routine labour,
respectively. Aggregate demand measured in terms of the consumption good, Yt =
Ct + Gt + ξtXt, is taken as given. Firms choose labor and capital inputs each period in
order to maximize profits:
Πzt = p
z
t yt − rtKt − wNRt nNRt − wRt nRt , (9)
subject to:
yt = zct + z
x
t = Ct + Gt + ξtXt = Yt. (10)
Firm maximization implies that pzt = P
C
t = 1, N
s
t (z) = N
s
t , ∀s, zct = Ct +Gt, zxt = ξtXt,
yt = Yt = Ct +Gt + ξtXt, and Yt = F(Kt, NNRt , N
R
t ), where Kt, N
NR
t , N
R
t are the aggregate
values of capital and the labor varieties. We assume that the production function of the
intermediate goods firm takes the following functional form:
Yt = F(Kt, NNRt , N
R
t ) = At
(
φ1Z
σ−1
σ
t + (1− φ1)N
R, σ−1σ
t
) σ
σ−1
, (11)
Zt =
(
φ2K
ρ−1
ρ
t + (1− φ2)N
NR, ρ−1ρ
t
) ρ
ρ−1
, (12)
where At is total factor productivity, φ1 and φ2 are factor shares, ρ is the elasticity of
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substitution between capital and non-routine labor, and σ is the elasticity of substitution
between the composite of those factors and routine labor. In a competitive equilibrium
firms set marginal products equal to factor prices:
rt =
[
Aσ−1t Yt
] 1
σ
φ1Z
σ−ρ
ρσ
t φ2
(
1
Kt
) 1
ρ
, (13)
wNRt =
[
Aσ−1t Yt
] 1
σ
φ1Z
σ−ρ
ρσ
t (1− φ2)
(
1
NNRt
) 1
ρ
, (14)
wRt = (1− φ1)
(
Aσ−1t Yt
NRt
) 1
σ
. (15)
The capital law of motion is:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Xt, (16)
where Xt is aggregate gross investment and δ is the depreciation rate.
Government
The social security system is managed by the government and runs a balanced budget.
Revenues are collected from taxes on employees and on the representative firm at rates
τss and τ˜ss, respectively, and are used to pay retirement benefits, Ψt.
The government then taxes consumption, τc and capital, τk, at flat rates. The labour
income tax follows a non-linear functional form as in Benabou (2002):
ya = 1− θ0y−θ1 , (17)
where θ0 and θ1 define the level and progressivity of the tax schedule respectively, y is
the pre-tax labour income and ya is the after tax labour income.5
Tax revenues from consumption, income and capital taxes are used to finance public
5See the Holter et al. (2014) for a more detailed discussion of the properties of this tax function.
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consumption of goods, Gt, public debt interest expenses, RtBt, and lump sum trans-
fers, gt. Denoting social security revenues by Rsst and the other tax revenues as Tt, the
government budget constraint is defined as:
gt
(
45+ ∑
j≥45
Ωj
)
= Tt − Gt − RtBt, (18)
Ψt
(
∑
j≥45
Ωj
)
= Rsst . (19)
Asset Structure
Households may hold two types of assets: capital, k and government bonds, b.6 There is
no investment-specific technological change in the steady state, i.e., ξ ′ = ξ. The return
rate on the bond must satisfy:
1
ξ
(ξ + (r− ξδ)(1− τk)) = 1+ R(1− τk), (20)
which follows from non-arbitrage: investing in capital must yield the same return as
investing the same amount in bonds. The state variable for the consumer is:
h ≡ [ξ + (r− δξ)(1− τk)]k + (1+ R(1− τk))b. (21)
Using 20, in equilibrium we can re-write the previous equation as:
h =
1
ξ
[ξ + (r− δξ)(1− τk)] (ξk + b) , (22)
where we define q ≡ ξ/ [ξ + (r− δξ)(1− τk)].
6In what follows, we suppress time subscripts for simplicity and use prime (’) to denote next period
values of a variable.
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Household Problem
On any given period a household is defined by age, j, asset position h, time discount
factor β ∈ {β1, β2}, permanent ability a, a persistent idiosyncratic productivity shock u,
and a time-constant ability to supply a given labor variety s ∈ {NR, R}. A working-age
household chooses consumption, c, work hours, n, and future asset holdings, h′, to solve
his optimization problem. The household budget constraint is given by:
c(1+ τc) + ξk′ + b′ = (ξ + (r− δξ)(1− τk))k + (1+ R(1− τk))b + Γ+ g +YN, (23)
where YL is the household’s labor income after social security and labour income taxes.
Using 21 and 22 we can rewrite the budget constraint as:
c(1+ τc) + qh′ = h + Γ+ g +YN. (24)
The household problem can then be formulated recursively as:
V(j, h, β, a, u) = max
c,n,h′
[
U (c, n) + βEu′
[
V(j + 1, h′, β, a, u′)
]]
s.t.:
c(1+ τc) + qh′ = h + Γ+ g +YN
YN =
nw (j, a, u)
1+ τ˜ss
(
1− τss − τl
(
nw (j, a, u)
1+ τ˜ss
))
n ∈ [0, 1], h′ ≥ −h, h0 = 0, c > 0,
The problem of a retired household differs on three dimensions: age dependent prob-
ability of dying pi(j), the bequest motive D(h′), and labour income, which is replaced by
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retirement benefits. Therefore, the retired household’s problem is defined as:
V(j, h, β) = max
c,h′
[
U (c, n) + β(1− pi(j))V(j + 1, h′, β) + pi(j)D(h′)
]
s.t.:
c(1+ τc) + qh′ = h + Γ+ g +Ψ
h′ ≥ −h, c > 0.
Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Φ(j, h, β, a, u) is the measure of agents with corresponding characteristics (j, h, β, a, u).
The stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by:
1. Taking factor prices and initial conditions as given, the value function V(j, h, β, a, u)
and the policy functions, c(j, h, β, a, u), h′(j, h, β, a, u), and n(j, h, β, a, u) solve the
household’s optimization problem.
2. Markets clear:
[ξ + (r− ξδ)(1− τk)]
(
K +
1
ξ
B
)
=
∫
h + Γ dΦ,
NNR =
∫
a>a∗
n dΦ,
NR =
∫
a≤a∗
n dΦ,
C + ξX + G = Y.
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3. Firms set marginal products equal to factor prices:
r =
[
Aσ−1Y
] 1
σ
φ1Z
σ−ρ
ρσ φ2
(
1
K
) 1
ρ
,
wNR =
[
Aσ−1Y
] 1
σ
φ1Z
σ−ρ
ρσ (1− φ2)
(
1
NNR
) 1
ρ
,
wR = (1− φ1)
(
Aσ−1Y
NR
) 1
σ
.
4. The government budget balances:
g
∫
dΦ+ G + RB =
∫ (
τk(r/ξ − δ)
(
h + Γ
ξ + (r− ξδ)(1− τk)
)
+ τcc + nτl
(
nw(a, u, j)
1+ τ˜ss
))
dΦ.
5. The social security system balances:
∫
j≥45
Ψ dΦ =
τ˜ss + τss
1+ τ˜ss
( ∫
j<45
nw dΦ
)
.
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γ
∫
ω(j)dΦ =
∫
(1−ω(j)) h dΦ.
5 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the baseline model to match the U.S. economy
in 1980. Parameters are either set directly (i.e., without solving the full model) to match
their empirical counterparts, or estimated by simulated method of moments (SMM).
Table 1 lists parameter values and sources.
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Table 1: 1980 Calibration Summary
Description Parameter Value Source
Preferences
Inverse Frisch elasticity η 1.000 Brinca et al. (2016)
Risk aversion parameter λ 1.000 Brinca et al. (2016)
Labor productivity
Parameter 1 age profile of wages γ1 0.265 Brinca et al. (2016)
Parameter 2 age profile of wages γ2 -0.005 Brinca et al. (2016)
Parameter 3 age profile of wages γ3 0.000 Brinca et al. (2016)
Variance of idiosyncratic risk σe 0.307 Brinca et al. (2016)
Persistence idiosyncratic risk ρu 0.335 Brinca et al. (2016)
NRS % wage difference a1 0.484 CPS
NRU % wage difference a2 -0.251 CPS
RS % wage difference a3 0.105 CPS
NRS weight p1 0.226 CPS
NRU weight p2 0.170 CPS
RS weight p3 0.181 CPS
Technology
Depreciation rate δ 0.060 Brinca et al. (2016)
Share of the composite φ1 0.516 Authors’ calculations
Share of capital φ2 0.654 Authors’ calculations
EOS routine/composite ρ 5.628 Authors’ calculations
EOS non-routine/capital σ 0.827 Authors’ calculations
Total factor productivity A 1.000 Normalization
Relative price of investment goods ξ 1.000 Normalization
Government and SS
Consumption tax rate τc 0.054 Mendoza et al. (1994)
Capital income tax rate τk 0.469 Mendoza et al. (1994)
Tax scale parameter θ0 0.850 Ferriere and Navarro (2018)
Tax progressivity parameter θ1 0.160 Ferriere and Navarro (2018)
Government debt to GDP B/Y 0.320 FRED
Military spending to GDP G/Y 0.050 World Bank
SS tax employees τss 0.061 Social Security Bulletin, July 1981
SS tax employers τ˜ss 0.061 Social Security Bulletin, July 1981
19
Preferences
There has been a considerable debate in the literature on the value of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, η, with estimates ranging from 0.5 to 2 or higher. We set it to 1.0, as in
Brinca et al. (2016). Discount factors, disutility from work and the borrowing limit are
calibrated by SMM and are discussed below.
Labor productivity
The wage profile through the life cycle (see equation 2) is calibrated directly from the
data. We run the following regression, using Panel of Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data:
ln(wi) = ln(w) + γ1 j + γ2 j2 + γ3 j3 + εi. (25)
where j is the age of individual i. We then use the residuals of the equation to estimate
the parameters governing the idiosyncratic shock ρ and σe. The wage differential of each
group, a, is calibrated to match the log difference in average wages between groups in
1980. The employment level of each group, which is equal to the probability of being
born into a given group, is set to equal its observed weight in total employment in 1980.
Technology
We use the method by Eden and Gaggl (2018) to estimate the parameters of the produc-
tion function, described in appendix B. Both total factor productivity and the relative
price of investment are set to unity in 1980.
Government Budget and Social Security
As described before, to capture the progressivity of both the tax schedule and govern-
ment transfers, we use the same labor income tax function as Benabou (2002) (equation
17). To estimate θ0 and θ1 in 1980 we use the method in Ferriere and Navarro (2018).
For the social security rates we assume no progressivity. Both social security tax rates,
on behalf of the employer and on behalf of the employee, are set to 0.06, the average rate
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in 1980. Finally, we set τc and τk to match the values obtained in Mendoza et al. (1994)
for 1980, i.e, τc = 0.05, τk = 0.47.
Parameters calibrated using SMM
To calibrate the parameters that do not have any direct empirical counterparts, ϕ, β1, β2,
β3, β4, h and χ, we use the simulated method of moments so that we minimize the
following loss function:
L(ϕ, β1, β2, β3, β4, h,χ) = ||Mm −Md|| (26)
with Mm and Md being the moments in the data and in the model respectively.
Given that we have seven parameters, we need seven data moments to have an exactly
identified system. The seven moments we target in the data are the ratio of the average
net asset position of households 65 and above relative to the average asset holdings in
the economy, four wealth quintiles and the wage premium. Calibration fit is presented
on Table 2. Table 3 presents the calibrated parameters. Note that the model fits the target
data with an error below 0.001, with the exception of the Q80 moment. This inability to
match the upper tail of the wealth distribution is the result of a low level of capital-to-
output required to achieve the target level of the wage premium. This is due to the fact
that we use a measure of productive capital that excludes residential structures, a large
portion of household wealth, to estimate the parameters of the production function. It
also explains the low level of calibrated discount factors.
Table 2: Calibration fit
Data moment Description Source Data Value Model value
65-on/all Average wealth of households 65 and over US Census Bureau 1.51 1.51
wNR/wR Wage Premium CPS 0.00 0.00
n Fraction of hours worked PWT 1/3 1/3
Q20, Q40, Q60, Q80 Wealth percentiles WID −0.01, 0.00,−0.04, 0.17 −0.01, 0.00,−0.04, 0.30
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Table 3: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description
ϕ 4.28 Bequest utility
β1, β2, β3, β4 0.939, 0.903, 0.902, 0.890 Discount factors
χ 6.1 Disutility of work
h 0.02 Borrowing limit
6 Results
The main experiment conducted in this section is to calculate a new steady state where
government and technology parameters are substituted to match more recent values.
Concretely, we have chosen 2010 values to calibrate the new steady state. We then
calculate the changes in observed inequality statistics and evaluate which parameters are
responsible for the most significant changes in those variables. Note that the transition
between steady states is not taken into account.
Parameters related to tastes, individual productivity processes and the production
function are kept constant between steady states: the age profile of wages (γ1, γ2, γ3),
the idiosyncratic productivity process (ρu and σe), preferences (λ, η, β1, β2, β3, and β4),
the borrowing constraint (h), depreciation (δ), and production function parameters (φ1,
φ2, σ and ρ).
Table 4 displays a comparison between 1980 and the new steady state parameter
values. The most relevant changes in the government calibration are in capital income
taxes, the labor income tax progressivity parameter, the level of government debt and
Social Security taxes. Investment prices are calibrated to match the observed drop from
1980 to 2010. Finally, group employment weights are adjusted to match those observed
in 2010.
Results from the experiment are displayed on Table 5. Model pre- and post-tax Gini
index increase by 0.053 and 0.050, respectively, when compared to the 1980 calibration
of the U.S. economy, or 42 and 47% of the total increase observed in the data between
1980 and 2010. The gap between the two inequality statistics also increases but only by
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Table 4: Parameter shifts
Parameter Description 1980 New SS
τc Consumption tax 0.050 0.054
τk Capital income tax 0.469 0.360
θ1 Tax level parameter 0.850 0.869
θ2 Tax progressivity parameter 0.160 0.095
B/Y Government debt 0.320 0.880
τss Employee SS tax 0.061 0.077
τ˜ss Employer SS tax 0.061 0.077
ξ Investment price 1.000 0.586
p1 NRS weight 0.226 0.392
p2 NRU weight 0.170 0.134
p3 RS weight 0.181 0.228
a fraction of the observed data. The wealth Gini index also increases but only by 0.05,
compared to the 0.07 change observed in the data. The non-routine wage premium in
the new steady state is nearly one and a half times larger than the one actually observed
in the data, indicating that the increase in the Gini index is being driven by an excessive
increase in this statistic compared to the one observed in the data.
To counter this drawback we calibrate a new steady state in which the drop in invest-
ment prices is such that the non-routine wage premium in 2010 is matched exactly. This
implies a 30% drop in the relative price of investment in lieu of the 40% drop observed
in the data. This steady state is characterized by a smaller increase in pre- and post-tax
income dispersion.
Note that the inequality statistics generated by the model are significantly below their
empirical counterparts. This is the result of limited sources of inequality built into the
model. Within each of the groups, differences in income between individuals are the
result of either age/experience or idiosyncratic risk. Differences in permanent ability
as in Brinca et al. (2016), which capture residual inequality within each group, are not
modeled. Nevertheless, we are focused on changes rather than levels at this stage.
We run additional experiments to isolate the contribution of each set of parameters.
Figure 3 provides a visualization of the results, which are detailed on Table 5. The
parameter which contributes the most to the pre-tax income Gini is the change in the
23
Table 5: Experiment Results
Data Model
1980 2010 1980 New SS New SS∗ τ˜SS, τSS τk θ2 B/Y Employment ξ ξ∗
Labor share 0.636 0.564 0.643 0.574 0.578 0.644 0.637 0.641 0.647 0.629 0.623 0.630
Gini index (pre-tax) 0.458 0.586 0.315 0.369 0.346 0.294 0.322 0.322 0.308 0.308 0.371 0.354
Gini index (post-tax) 0.374 0.480 0.229 0.279 0.265 0.206 0.233 0.246 0.230 0.224 0.252 0.245
Gini gap 0.085 0.107 0.086 0.090 0.082 0.088 0.089 0.076 0.079 0.085 0.119 0.109
NR wage premium (%) 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.334 0.143 -0.025 0.084 0.012 -0.060 -0.161 0.375 0.217
Wealth Gini index 0.81 0.88 0.70 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.74 0.72
Q20 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Q40 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
Q60 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Q80 0.17 0.12 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.23
Notes: table indicates the values of each statistic from the data and the different model calibrations. A star indicates the model where the drop
in the relative price of investment is set to match the rise in the non-routine wage premium. The isolated impacts of τc, θ0 and government
spending are not shown due to their residual contribution to the changes of the statistics of interest.
relative price of investment. This is due to its significant impact on the non-routine
wage premium, which creates a large wedge between non-routine and routine wages.
However, the impact of this parameter is dampened by the progressivity of the labor
tax schedule (which is kept at 1980 levels), with the increase of the post-tax income Gini
being limited to almost half of the pre-tax increase.7 By itself, the change in investment
prices is responsible for 21% of the increase in the pos-tax Gini index. In the experiment
where the non-routine wage premium is matched, this figure drops to 15%.
The drop in progressivity also increases income dispersion by reducing the distortion
on the labor supply at the top of the earnings distribution. In particular, it has a signif-
icant impact on the pos-tax inequality. Coupled with the drop in investment prices, it
is responsible for generating the large increase in the post-tax income Gini in the full
model. Alone, this channel accounts for 16% of the change in the post-tax Gini observed
in the data.
The reduction in capital income taxes fosters capital accumulation, increasing the
marginal productivity of non-routine labor relative to routine labor and raising the wage
7Note that changes in the non-routine wage premium have a non-trivial effect on the earnings distribu-
tion: while they increase the wage of the non-routine skilled group, it also reduces the negative differential
of non-routine unskilled workers, bringing their earnings closer to the average.
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(a) Income dispersion (b) Change in wage premium
Figure 3: Impact of changes in parameters. A star indicates the model where the drop in the
relative price of investment is set to match the rise in the non-routine wage premium. The y-axis
indicates the difference observed in each calibration with respect to the 1980 calibration.
premium. Furthermore, it also produces greater post-tax capital income, contributing to
the increase in income dispersion, albeit only modestly.
Some of the observed structural shifts during our period of analysis have also con-
tributed to a dampening in the effects produced by investment-specific technological
change and the reduction in progressivity. The large increase in government debt-to-
GDP produces a crowding out of private capital, reducing the relative productivity of
non-routine labor and the wage premium. The employment shifts in this period, in
particular the surge in the relative employment of non-routine workers, has also coun-
teracted wage premium growth in a significant manner, generating a modest reduction
in overall income inequality by itself.
Finally, the increase in Social Security contributions has a large negative effect income
dispersion. This is the result of the highly progressive nature of the Social Security bloc
in the model: contributions are collected as a flat tax on labor income and redistributed
lump sum to retirees.8 This apparent modeling limitation cushions the increase in in-
come inequality from other sources, implying that the increase in the income Gini in the
8Both the data and the model pre-tax income Gini include pensions, but exclude Social Security con-
tributions.
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full model would be larger if the impact of social security distributions would be more
muted.
Our future work will involve the nesting of a total of four labor varieties in the
production function, which will allow us to generate an endogenous skill premium and
increase the quantitative significance of the changes in the income Gini index.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a framework which can quantitatively explain the rise in inequality in the
U.S. since 1980. Our calculations show that structural changes in technology, government
policy and employment are able to produce an increase of the income Gini index which
is one third of the change in post-tax income Gini observed in the data.
The main mechanisms at play are the rise in the non-routine wage premium, which
increases the dispersion in the earnings distribution and the ability of a fraction of the
population to accumulate greater amounts of wealth relative to the lower quintiles. Ad-
ditionally, the reduction in the progressivity of the labor income tax schedule reduces
labor supply distortions and increases the post-tax income Gini index. We show that
ISTC alone accounts for 15% of the change in observed post-tax income Gini, while the
reduction in progressivity accounts for 16%.
Our next steps involve expanding the model to account for the role of capital-skill
complementarity, in the same manner that capital-non-routine complementarity was in-
troduced. This will allow us to study the effects of technological change on both the
non-routine and the skill wage premium in a single framework, and attempt to observe
the impact of these two theories of the impact of technological change on earnings in-
equality. We will also refine our experiment by recasting it as unexpected change in the
trend of ISTC, enabling us to analyze the path of income dispersion measures in a more
realistic way relative to the comparison of steady states.
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A Wage premium regression
The following cross-sectional regression model is estimated separately for each gender
and year t, weighted by ASEC weights:
ln wi,t = α0, t + α1,tXi,t + ei,t for t ∈ {1967, ..., 2016}
The dependent variable is the log of weekly wages, obtained by dividing the yearly labor
earnings by the number of weeks worked. The categories contained in Xi,t are:
1. Five education categories: high school dropouts, high school graduates, some
college, college graduate, and greater than college;
2. Two task types: routine and non-routine;
3. Three race types: white, black, and non-white other;
4. Potential experience: 5, 15, 25, 35, 45 years.
We use white college males with 45 years of experience and in routine occupations as
the base set of categories. The wage premia are obtained as the difference between the
average log-wages in each year for two groups whose only difference is in either skill or
task type.
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B Production function
Given the fact that Yt = wNRt N
NR
t + w
R
t N
R
t + rtRt, we can write income shares as:
sN,t =
wNRt N
NR
t + w
R
t N
R
t
Yt
, (27)
sK,t =
rtKt
Yt
, (28)
where sN,t, sK,t are the shares of labor and capital, and sN,t + sK,t = 1. Firm optimality
conditions together with equations 27 and 28 imply the following relationships between
factor shares and quantities:
ln
(
sK,t
sNR,t
)
= ln
(
φ2
1− φ2
)
+
(
ρ− 1
ρ
)
ln
(
Kt
NNRt
)
, (29)
ln
(
sR,t
sZ,t
)
= ln
(
φ1
1− φ1
)
+
(
σ− 1
σ
)
ln
(
NRt
Zt
)
, (30)
where sNR,t, sR,t and sZ,t are the income shares of non-routine labor, routine labor, and
the composite input. We calibrate φ1, φ2, ρ, and σ by estimating 29 and 30 using the
following two-step procedure: (i) estimate 29 by OLS and compute implied quantities
for Zt; (ii) estimate 30 by OLS, using the estimates for Zt.
For the labor shares, we use the series presented on Section 3 and rescale them to
match the BLS private non-farm labor share. The capital labor share is calculated as the
residual of the (BLS) labor share and the the profit share from equation. The share of the
composite Zt is the sum of the capital and non-routine income shares.
Because the goal is to obtain a measurement of inputs in similar units, we measure
input quantities in dollars and deflate them with the GDP price deflator (2005=1). For
labor inputs we use the series of aggregate wage bills by task type rescaled so as the sum
of the labor shares of both groups matches the BLS aggregate labor share. Thus, changes
in wage bills reflect either changing hours or changing productivity. For this reason, the
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non-routine aggregate wage bill is rescaled so that the level of the wage premium does
not affect our measurement of the non-routine input. The quantity of capital is measured
as the stock of private and government non-residential capital.
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